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Review of Wittgenstein -- Rethinking the Inner by Paul 






Overall Johnston has done a phenomenal job and this book should be required 
reading for all those interested in behavior. 
 
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study of 
behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, politics, 
sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most books and articles, with even 
the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat wrong. There is 
a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, and possibly this preposterous 
situation will change, especially due to the continuing efforts of Peter Hacker, 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock and more recently Annalisa Coliva. I will first offer some 
comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and 
Wittgenstein from the modern two systems of thought perspective as W did 60 
years ago. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
" But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 





"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6(1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of philosophy)." 
Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 “…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of 
language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations…the 
forms of the status function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic 
powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on 
is to recognize  a reason for action…these deontic structures make possible desire-
independent reasons for action…The general point is very clear: the creation of the 
general field of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a 
system of desire-independent reasons for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality… 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological illusion.” Searle 
PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has no 
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causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying 
neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it cannot be 
reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something that exists 
independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
Before commenting in detail on Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner (WRTI) I will 
first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of 
Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place any 
commentator on W and behavior in proper perspective.  
 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His 
work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms 
and that our conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges from unconscious 
machinations (System 1) (S1). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final extended 
treatment of this idea-and my review thereof for preparation. His corpus can be 
seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the 
mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains 
share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way 
they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals 
share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans 
this is extended into a personality (a cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based 
on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with 
variations that can be regarded as trivial). 
 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work and indeed all of philosophy is a development of 
or variation on these ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all 
discussion of human behavior, is the need to separate the genetically programmed 
automatisms, which underlie all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few 
philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this 
in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they are dealing with. 
I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all study of higher order 
behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions 






What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less clear 
way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal 
behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a unique 
textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. 
He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and 
humanities, and even those few who have more or less understood him, have not 
realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions 
(Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of fast and slow thinking etc., --see below). 
Searle’s work expands upon this and provides a stunning description of higher 
order social behavior that is possible because of the recent evolution of genes for 
dispositional psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional 
thinking of S2. 
 
I suggest the key to W is to regard his corpus as the pioneering effort in deciphering 
our EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves of S1 and S2 and the 
multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd 
period works and reading backwards to the Proto-Tractatus. It should also be clear 
that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of behavior are describing 
the same phenomena and ought to translate easily into one another. Thus, the 
recently fashionable themes of "Embodied Mind" and "Radical Enactivism" should 
flow directly from and into W's work (and they do). However, almost nobody is 
able to follow his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, 
so even the redoubtable Searle has to be filtered and translated to see that this is 
true, and even he does not get how completely W has anticipated the latest work in 
fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (writing, speaking, acting). 
 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—which 
can be regarded as the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the 
careful analysis of examples of language use in context. He exposes the many 
varieties of language games and the relationships between the primary games of 
the true-only unconscious, pre or proto-linguistic axiomatic fast thinking of 
perception, memory and reflexive thinking, emotions and acts (often described as 
the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self, mirror neuron 
functions), and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional linguistic conscious 
abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false 
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propositional secondary language games of slow thinking that are the network of 
cognitive illusions that constitute the second-self personality of which we are so 
enamored. W dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only 
perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of S1 grade into the thinking, 
remembering, and understanding of S2 dispositions, and many of his examples also 
address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his 
later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that 
this evolutionary two systems perspective illuminates all higher behavior. 
Dobzhansky famously commented: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the 




The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature") that language is a window on or some 
sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other 
"Language of Thought" of which it is a translation, were rejected by W (and likewise 
by S), who tried to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious 
examples of language in action, that language is the best picture we can ever get of 
thinking, the mind and human nature, and W's whole corpus can be regarded as 
the development of this idea. Long before Searle, he rejected the idea that the 
Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology and computation 
(e.g., Behaviorism, Functionalism, Strong AI, DST, CTM, etc.) could reveal what his 
Top Down deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties 
he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can now see this 
as obliviousness to System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological illusion’) 
and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find 
a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle 
contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a window into the mind but is the 
mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts 
(i.e., our speech using the later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the 
Second Self--the dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending 
etc.).    
 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment that 
even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking--this 
should be the 
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motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, of Cognitive Psychology. But 
God could see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking, 
since these S1 functions are always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are 
only potentially CMS. This is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and our 
physiology. S muddies the waters here because he refers to dispositions as mental 
states as well, but as W did long ago, he shows that the language of causality just 
does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 descriptions—again not a theory 
but a description about how language (thinking) works. This brings up another 
point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we can do is give descriptions 
and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories but of course “theory” and 
“description” are language games too and it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s 
description—a rose by any other name….  W’s point was that by sticking to 
perspicacious examples that we all know to be true accounts of our behavior, we 
avoid the quicksand of theories that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language 
games), while S wants to generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several 
examples of his own mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their 
theories to account for the multifarious language games they get closer and closer 
to describing behavior by way of numerous examples as did W. 
 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the different 
(but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or roughly 
Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the 
Inner and the Outer and the impossibility of private language and the axiomatic 
structure of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first described S1 functions 
but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole 
mythology of inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were 
seeing pictures inside the brain.  The PLG's are utterances by and descriptions of 
our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, non-
propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts 
(including System 1 Truths and UA1 (Understanding of Agency 1) and Emotions1- 
such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily 
later SLG's are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and 
Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only 
be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see 




It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons (e.g., 
`I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms of EP, 
genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is meaningless to 
give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense in the future--
`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 
and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 
etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical extensions or 
"Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). W recognized that 
`Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all 
philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is 
not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us--we just 
have to stop trying to look deeper. 
 
Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding "language 
philosophy" as a separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since language 
is just another name for the mind. And, when W says that understanding behavior 
is in no way dependent on the progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
`young science' --but cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted-- "Is 
scientific progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered 
lighten the philosophers task. Imagining possibilities." (LWPP1, 807). So, he is not 
legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out that our behavior (mostly 
speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology and that all discussions of 
higher order behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. 
 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating 
and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to provide the 
physical basis for our behavior and facilitate our analysis of language games which 
nevertheless remain unexplainable--EP just is this way-- and unchanged. The true-
only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 'On Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) 
"bedrock" or "background" i.e., evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the 
automated true-only reactions of bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), 
which evolved and operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's 
superb "Principles of Social Evolution". 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions rather 
than explanations, but of course these too are complex language games and one 
8 
 
person's description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their innate true-only, 
nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to the world, animals 
extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further true only 
understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this is a complex language 
game even in the context of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as 
unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or our breathing. This 
dramatically changes one’s view of human nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a 
theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of Agency (UA a term I 
devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and worms if UA is 
suitably defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). 
However, as I note here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there 
are System 1 and System 2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UA1 
and the Slow conscious UA2 and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted 
phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— 
higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, reflexive 
thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s examples explore this 
two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in 
Johnston).  
 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, intelligent 
person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least half a century 
earlier. One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all that is relevant to it into our 
true only background via the inexorable workings of evolutionary psychology (EP). 
Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly stupefying that 
even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of human life 
(with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) which was laid out in great 
detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation of logic and our axiomatic 
psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock (DMS), but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of 
our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. 
Football or Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my or our memory and 
vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed out of and are tied to 
countless others in the true only network that begins with birth and extends in all 
directions to encompass much of our awareness and memory. A corollary, nicely 
explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the 
skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense 
including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of 
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involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout 
his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work ` On Certainty'), are equivalent 
to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see 
Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the framework 
some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds 
to the mental states of perception (including UA1) and memory and involuntary 
acts, as W notes over and over in endless examples. One might call these 
"intracerebral reflexes" (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use 
in the brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized 
as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not 
mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not have any definite time of 
occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words like "knowing", 
"understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed extensively, have at 
least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but graduating into 
everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers inspired W to write OC), 
which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and 
memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), 
and the S2 one, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, 
and which can become true or false (`I know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like 
"cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these 
too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these 
words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations 
of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of slow System 2 
dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or intentional action cannot 
occur without involving much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", 
"inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", 
"background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
One of W's recurring themes was what is now called Theory of Mind (TOM), or as 
I prefer Understanding of Agency (UA), but of course he did not use these terms, 
which is the subject of major research efforts now. I recommend consulting the work 
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of Ian Apperly, who is carefully dissecting UA1 and 2 and who has recently become 
aware of one of the leading Wittgensteinian philosophers Daniel Hutto, since Hutto 
has now characterized UA1 as a fantasy (or rather insists that there is no `Theory' 
nor representation involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2). However, like 
other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this between 
60 and 80 years ago. 
 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not accurately describe nor determine how 
we act—now a pillar of the behavioral sciences. See ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ 
in Searle’s ‘Philosophy in a New Century’ (PNC) for a grand example from 
philosophy. It is an obvious corollary of W’s and S’s descriptive psychology that it 
is the unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior 
and that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, 
desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most strikingly borne 
out by the latest experimental psychology, some of which is nicely summarized by 
Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two Selves', but of course there 
is a huge volume of recent work he does not cite and an endless stream of pop and 
pro books issuing). It is an easily defensible view that most of the burgeoning 
literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is wholly 
compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
 
Regarding my view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has noticed 
that he very clearly explained several times specifically and many times in passing, 
the psychology behind what later became known as the Wason Test--long a 
mainstay of EP research. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes aphoristically 
and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is 
to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the 
true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, 
since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged.  Sometimes 
“certainty” is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, 
is the result of extending our axiomatic and non-revisable certainty (Certainty1) via 
experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false).  This is of 
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course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence 
by language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or 
many) distinct uses.  
 
Again, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 functioning that is 
‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, a matter of 
evidence but a true-only understanding in our own case and a true-only perception 
in the case of others. 
 
We again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and life) of identical 
words glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of ‘belief’, ‘seeing’ etc., as applied 
to S1 which is composed of mental states in the present only, and S2 which is not. 
From an evolutionary or Wittgensteinian perspective, is the automatic fast actions 
of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably and universally 
expanded during personal development into a wide array of automatic unconscious 
deontic relationships with others, and arbitrarily into cultural variations on them.  
 
To put it in my terms, S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, 
automatic, non-propositional, true only mental states –roughly the domain of the 
Inner, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions 
that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are 
or can become propositional (T or F)—roughly the domain of the Outer.  
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists 
for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our EP 
which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through 
slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious.  
However, it is true that most of behavior is mechanical and that The 
Phenomenological Illusion is of vastly greater reach than Searle describes. It is most 
striking to me when driving a car on the freeway and suddenly snapping back to 
S2 awareness startled to realize I have just driven for several minutes with no 
conscious awareness at all. On reflection, this automatism can be seen to account 
for almost all of our behavior with just minimal supervision and awareness from 
S2.  I am writing this page and have to think about what to say, but then it just flows 
out into my hands which type it and by and large it’s a surprise to me except when 
I think of changing a specific sentence. And you read it giving commands to your 
body to sit still and look at this part of the page but the words just flow into you 
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and some kind of understanding and memory happen but unless you concentrate 
on a sentence there is only a vague sense of doing anything. A soccer player runs 
down the field and kicks the ball and thousands of nerve impulses and muscle 
contractions deftly coordinated with eye movements, and feedback from 
proprioceptive and balance organs have occurred, but there is only a vague feeling 
of control and high level awareness of the results. S2 is the Chief of Police who sits 
in his office while S1 has thousands of officers doing the actual work according to 
laws that he mostly does not even know.  Reading, writing or soccer are voluntary 
acts A2 seen from above but composed of thousands of automatic acts A1 seen from 
below. 
 
It is a good idea to read at least Chapter 6 of PNC, “The Phenomenological Illusion” 
(TPI). It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 
and to taking the slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there 
is. This is classic Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 
years earlier and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only 
unconscious automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1 which is the 
source of the Inner. Very roughly, regarding ‘observer independent’ features of the 
world as S1 or The Inner, and ‘observer dependent’ features as S2 or The Outer 
should prove very revealing. As S notes, the Phenomenologists have the ontology 
exactly backwards, but of course so does almost everyone due to the defaults of 
their EP.   
 
Though he was writing in the early 90’s when most of the above ideas from Searle 
and the recent work in psychology were not yet published, Johnston’s WRTI does 
a brilliant job of showing how W disposed of the myth of the Inner via careful 
examples of language in action.  Central to this is one of W’s brilliant insights—the 
impossibility of a private language --and Johnston (J) explains and expands on W’s 
view of this quite well. There cannot be any test for the correctness of our private 
‘Inner’ phenomena, only for Outer public behavior.  Our Inner S1 phenomenology 
(sensations, perceptions, memories etc.) only has a description because, during 
growth, we generate a language in our more recently evolved higher cortical S2 
regions for describing Outer behavior.  The language of publicly viewable 
behaviors of feeling, thinking, knowing etc., are then applied as we grew up as a 
species and as individuals (ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny) to represent our 
Inner life. However, its only connection with the Inner is the behavior we can see.  
“Pain” is the inner S1 primitive that we learn to describe with many S2 terms— “My 
arm is throbbing”, “It hurts just to think of it” etc.  
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J notes that some will object that if our reports and memories are really untestable 
they would have no value but “This objection misses the whole point of W’s 
argument, for it assumes that what actually happened, and what the individual says 
happened, are two distinct things. As we have seen, however, the grammar of 
psychological statements means that the latter constitutes the criteria for the former. 
If we see someone with a concentrated expression on her face and want to know 
‘what is going on inside her’, then her sincerely telling us that she is trying to work 
out the answer to a complicated sum tells us exactly what we want to know. The 
question of whether, despite her sincerity, her statement might be an inaccurate 
description of what she is (or was) doing does not arise. The source of confusion 
here is the failure to recognize that psychological concepts have a different grammar 
from that of concepts used to describe outer events. What makes the inner seem so 
mysterious is the misguided attempt to understand one concept in terms of another. 
In fact, our concept of the Inner, what we mean when we talk of ‘what was going 
on inside her’ is linked not to mysterious inner processes, but to the account which 
the individual offers of her experience…As processes or events, what goes on inside 
the individual is of no interest, or rather is of a purely medical or scientific interest 
(p13-14).  
 
“W’s attack on the notion of inner processes does not imply that only the Outer 
matters, on the contrary; by bringing out the true nature of utterances, he underlines 
the fact that we aren’t just interested in behavior.  We don’t just want to know that 
the person’s body was in such and such a position and that her features arranged 
in such and such a way. Rather we are interested in her account of what lay behind 
this behavior…” (p16-17) 
 
In laying out W’s reasoning on the impossibility of private rules or a private 
language, he notes that “The real problem however is not simply that she fails to 
lay down rules, but that in principle she could not do so…The point is that without 
publicly checkable procedures, she could not distinguish between following the 
rule and merely thinking she is following the rule.” 
 
He then quotes one of W’s most famous passages which makes this issue crystal 
clear: “Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No 
one can look into anyone else’s box and everyone says he knows what a beetle is 
only by looking at his beetle. -Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have 
something different in his box. One might even imaging such a thing constantly 
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changing. -But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a use in these people’s language? If 
so, it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in 
the language-game at all, not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. 
No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is” 
(PI P293). 
 
And J nicely sums it up “This approach to the Inner involves a completely new way 
of understanding our psychological concepts. It also involves rejecting the 
confusing picture which treats the Inner as though it were a substance whose 
changes, states and motions the individual observes and reports on. In contrast, W’s 
approach emphasizes that what interests us is the attitudes and behavior of human 
beings.” (p27). 
 
The mythology of the Inner can be seen as another instance of the Phenomenological 
Illusion so nicely deconstructed by Searle.  Oblivious to the automaticity of the Inner 
System 1, we try, like the Phenomenologists, to explain the fast-automatic 
unconscious behaviors of S1 in terms of the slow, conscious behaviors of S2 and so 
we use the S2 dispositional language. ‘I think I’ll go out now’ comes out without a 
thought but it can also come out after thought. 
 
His next chapter “The World of the Senses” discusses the various language games 
of “seeing” and “seeing as”.  Though generally quite good he fails to make clear 
enough to suit me, W’s distinction between the true only S1 game of ‘seeing’ as a 
mental state with clear duration and the S2 game of “seeing as” that lacks clear 
duration and which is not really a mental state in the same sense. The perception 
becomes an object of reflection (slow thinking) in seconds and so is ‘seen’ and ‘seen 
as’ essentially simultaneously by S1 and S2 which feed into each other. His quote 
shows that W understood this well: “This makes this object into a chimera; a queerly 
shifting construction. For the similarity to a picture is now impaired.” (PI p196), and 
of course hundreds of pages from W’s third period discuss the relations between S1 
and S2. 
   
On p55 J makes the point with respect to vision (which has been made many times 
by W and S in this and other contexts) that the discussion of the Outer is entirely 
dependent for its very intelligibility on the unchallengeable nature of our direct first 
person experience of the Inner. The System 2 sceptical doubts concerning mind, 
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will, senses, world, cannot get a foothold without the true only certainties of System 
1 and the certainty that you are reading these words now is the basis for judgment, 
not a thing that can itself be judged.  This mistake is one of the most basic and 
common in all philosophy.  
 
On p81 he makes the point that the impossibility, in the normal case, of checking 
your statements concerning your dispositions (often but confusingly called 
‘propositional attitudes’) such as what you thought or are feeling far from being a 
defect of our psychology is exactly what gives these statements interest.  “I am 
tired” tells us how you are feeling rather than giving us another bit of data about 
the Outer such as your slow movements or the shadows under your eyes.   
 
He then does an excellent job of explaining W’s debunking of the idea that meaning 
or understanding (and all dispositions) are experiences that accompany speech.  As 
W pointed out, just consider the case where you think you understand, and then 
find out you did not, to see the irrelevance of any inner experience to meaning, 
understanding, thinking, believing, knowing etc.  The experience which counts is 
the awareness of the public language game we participate in.  Similar 
considerations dissolve the problem of the ‘lightning speed of thought’.  “The key 
is to recognize that thinking is not a process or a succession of experiences but an 
aspect of the lives of conscious beings. What corresponds to the lightning speed of 
thought is the individual’s ability to explain at any point what she is doing or 
saying.” (p86). And as W says “Or, if one calls the beginning and the end of the 
sentence the beginning and end of the thought, then it is not clear whether one 
should say of the experience of thinking that it is uniform during this time or 
whether it is a process like speaking the sentence itself” (RPP2 p237). 
 
Again: “The individuals account of what she thought has the same grammar as her 
account of what she intended and of what she meant. What we are interested in is 
the account of the past she is inclined to give and the assumption that she will be 
able to give an account is part of what is involved in seeing her as conscious” (p 91). 
That is, all these disposition verbs are part of our conscious, voluntary S2 
psychology.   
 
In “The Complexity of the Inner”, he notes that it is ironic that our best way to 
communicate the Inner is to refer to the Outer but I would say it is both natural and 
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unavoidable. Since there is no private language and no telepathy, we can only 
contract muscles and by far the most efficient and deep communication is by 
contracting oral muscles (speech). As W commented in several contexts, it is in plays 
(or now in TV and films) that we see language (thought) in its purest form. 
 
Dispositions like intending continue as long as we don’t change or forget them and 
thus lack a precise duration, as well as levels of intensity and the content is a 
decision and so it not a precise mental state so in all these respects they are quite 
different from S1 perceptions, memories and reflexive responses like S1 emotions.   
 
The difference between S1 and S2 (as I put - this was not a terminology available to 
J or W) also is seen in the asymmetry of the disposition verbs, with the first person 
use of ‘I believe’ etc., being (in the normal case of sincere utterance) true-only 
sentences vs the third person use ‘he believes’ etc., being true or false evidence-
based propositions. One cannot say “I believe it is raining and it isn’t” but other 
tenses such as “I believed it was raining and it wasn’t” or the third person “He 
believes it is raining and it isn’t” are OK. As J says: “The general issue at the heart 
of the problem here is whether the individual can observe her own 
dispositions…The key to clarifying this paradox is to note that the individuals 
description of her own state of mind is also indirectly the description of a state of 
affairs…In other words, someone who says she believes P is thereby committed to 
asserting P itself…The reason therefor that the individual cannot observe her belief 
is that by adopting a neutral or evaluatory stance towards it, she undermines it. 
Someone who said “I believe it’s raining but it isn’t” would thereby undermine her 
own assertion. As W notes, there can be no first person equivalent of the third 
person use of the verb for the same reason that a verb meaning to believe falsely 
would lack a first person present indicative...the two propositions are not 
independent, for ‘the assertion that this is going on inside me asserts: this is going on 
outside me’ (RPP1 p490)” (p154-56).  Though not commented on by W or J, the fact 
that children never make such mistakes as “I want the candy but I don’t believe I 
want it” etc., shows that such constructions are built into our grammar (into our 
genes) and not cultural add-ons. 
 
He then looks at this from another viewpoint by citing W “What would be the point 
of my drawing conclusions from my own words to my behavior, when in any case 
I know what I believe? And what is the manifestation of my knowing what I 
believe? Is it not manifested precisely in this-that I do not infer my behaviour from 
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my words?  That is the fact.” (RPP1 p744).  Another way to say this is that S1 is the 
axiomatic true-only basis for cognition and as the non-propositional substrate for 
determining truth and falsity cannot be intelligibly judged.  
 
He ends the chapter with important comments on the variability within the LG’s 
(within our psychology) and I suggest it be read carefully. 
 
J continues the discussion in “The Inner/Outer Picture” much of which is summed 
up in his quote from W. “The inner is hidden from us means that it is hidden from 
us in a sense that it is not hidden from him. And it is not hidden from the owner in 
the sense that he gives expression to it, and we, under certain conditions, believe his 
expression and there error has no place. And this asymmetry in the game is 
expressed in the sentence that the Inner is hidden from other people.” (LWPP2 p36). 
J goes on: “The problem is not that that inner is hidden but that the language game 
it involves is very different from those where we normally talk about knowledge.”  
And then he enters into one of W’s major themes throughout his life—the difference 
between man and machine. “But with a human being the assumption is that it is 
impossible to gain an insight into the mechanism. Thus, indeterminacy is 
postulated…I believe unpredictability must be an essential characteristic of the 
Inner. As also is the endless diversity of expressions.” (RPP2 p645 and LWPP2 p65). 
Again, W probes the difference between animals and computers. 
 
J notes that the uncertainties in our LG’s are not defects but critical to our humanity. 
Again W: “[What matters is] not that the evidence makes the feeling (and so the 
Inner) merely probable, but that we treat this as evidence for something important, 
that we base a judgement on this involved sort of evidence, and so that such 
evidence has a special importance in our lives and is made prominent by a concept.” 
(Z p554). 
 
J sees three aspects of this uncertainty as the lack of fixed criteria or fine shades of 
meaning, the absence of rigid determination of the consequences of inner states and 
the lack of  fixed relationships between our concepts and experience. W: ”One can’t 
say what the essential observable consequences of an inner state are. When, for 
example, he really is pleased, what is then to be expected of him, and what not? 
There are of course such characteristic consequences, but they can’t be described in 
the same way as reactions which characterize the state of a physical object.” (LWPP2 
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p90).  J “Here her inner state is not something we cannot know because we cannot 
penetrate the veil of the Outer. Rather there is nothing determinate to know.” 
(p195).   
 
In his final chapter, he notes that our LG’s are not likely to change regardless of 
scientific progress. “Although it is conceivable that the study of brain activity might 
turn out to be a more reliable predictor of human behavior, the sort of 
understanding of human action it gave would not be the same as that involved in 
the language game on intentions. Whatever the value of the scientists’ discovery, it 
could not be said to have revealed what intentions really are.” (p213).  
 
This indeterminateness leads to the notion that correlation of brain states with 
dispositions seems unlikely. “The difficulty here is that the notion of one thought is 
a highly artificial concept. How many thoughts are there in the Tractatus? And 
when the basic idea for it struck W, was that one thought or a rash of them? The 
notion of intentions creates similar problems…These subsequent statements can all 
be seen as amplifications or explanations of the original thought, but how are we to 
suppose this relates to the brain state? Are we to imagine that it too will contain the 
answer to every possible question about the thought?... we would have to allow that 
two significantly different thoughts are correlated with the same brain state…words 
may in one sense be interchangeable and in another sense not. This creates problems 
for the attempt to correlate brain states and thoughts…two thoughts may be the 
same in one sense and different in another…Thus the notion of one thought is a 
fragile and artificial one and for that reason it is hard to see what sense it could 
make to talk of a one to one correlation with brain states.” (p218-219).   
Likewise, W denies that memory consists of traces in the nervous system. “Here the 
postulated trace is like the inner clock, for we no more infer what happened from a 
trace than we consult an inner clock to guess the time.” He then notes an example 
from W (RPP1 p908) of a man jotting marks while he reads and who cannot repeat 
the text without the marks but they don’t relate to the text by rules …  ”The text 
would not be stored up in the jottings. And why should it be stored up in our nervous 
system?” and also “…nothing seems more plausible to me than that people will 
some day come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in either the 
physiological or the nervous systems which corresponds to a particular thought or 
a particular idea of memory” (LWPP1 p504). This implies that there can be 
psychological regularities to which no physiological regularities correspond; and as 
W provocatively adds ‘If this upsets our concepts of causality, then it is high time 
they were upset.’” (RPP1 p905) … ’Why should not the initial and the terminal states 
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of a system be connected by a natural law which does not cover the intermediary 
state? (RPP1 p909) ... [It is quite likely that] there is no process in the brain correlated 
with associating or with thinking, so that it would be impossible to read off thought 
processes from brain processes…Why should this order, so to speak, not proceed 
out of chaos? ... as it were, causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not 
really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and writing.’(RPP1 
p903)…But must there be a physiological explanation here? Why don’t we just leave 
explaining alone? -but you would never talk like that if you were examining the 
behavior of a machine! –Well who says that a living creature, an animal body, is a 
machine in this sense?’”  (RPPI p918) (p 220-21). 
 
Of course, one can take these comments variously, but one way is that W anticipates 
the rise of chaos theory, embodied mind and self-organization in biology. Since 
uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability are standard doctrine now, from subatomic 
to molecular scale, and in planetary dynamics (weather etc.,) and cosmology, why 
should the brain be an exception? 
 
J’s final section on Freud is ok but not especially interesting and the appendix on 
Seeing As and Perception likewise. I feel that there is a great advantage in treating 
these topics from the modern two systems perspective and that this is basically 
what W did 60 years ago. Overall J has done a phenomenal job and this book should 
be required reading for all those interested in behavior.  
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study of 
behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, politics, 
sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most books and articles, with even 
the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat wrong. There is 
a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, and possibly this preposterous 
situation will change, but probably not much.  
 
To show this framework and how it relates to a contemporary view of intentionality 
I have produced the following table. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date 
account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two 
systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) 




The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual 
processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be 
regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of 
personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of 
Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the 
Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here 
and in my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table 
by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books 
on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker.  The last 9 rows come principally from decision 
research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
I give detailed explanations of this table in my other writings.  
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World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 




No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 




A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 












I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**          Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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